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Winston Churchill’s “Crazy Broadcast”: Party,
Nation, and the 1945 Gestapo Speech
Richard Toye
“One Empire; One Leader; One Folk!”
Is the Tory campaign master-stroke.
As a National jest,
It is one of the best,
But it’s not an original joke.
(Anon., “Plagiarism,” New Statesman and Nation, 30 June 1945)
No Socialist Government conducting the entire life and industry ofthe country could afford to allow free, sharp, or violently-wordedexpressions of public discontent,” said Winston Churchill on 4 June
1945 in the first radio broadcast of that year’s general election campaign. “They
would have to fall back on some form of Gestapo, no doubt very humanely directed
in the first instance.”1 That August, nursing his wounds after his defeat at the
hands of Clement Attlee’s Labour Party, Churchill claimed privately to have no
regrets. As Charles Eade recorded in his diary, “He said the time would come
when that particular speech would be recognised as one of the greatest he had
ever delivered.”2 In fact, the speech has retained all of the notoriety that it gained
Richard Toye is an associate professor in the Department of History at the University of Exeter. He
previously worked at the Universities of Manchester and Cambridge. In 2007 he won the Times Higher
Education Young Academic Author of the Year Award. I am grateful to Christopher Catherwood, Paul
Corthorn, David Edgerton, Ben Jackson, and Andrew Thorpe for comments and suggestions. Any
errors that remain are, of course, my own responsibility.
1 Broadcast of 4 June 1945. Unless otherwise stated, all of Churchill’s broadcasts and speeches referred
to here can be found in Robert Rhodes James, ed., Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches,
1897–1963, 8 vols. (New York, 1974).
2 Charles Eade, diary entry, 31 August 1945, Charles Eade Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cam-
bridge (CAC). There was a slightly different emphasis in his remarks to the editor of The Times at
around the same time: “He offered no explanation [for his defeat] himself except to say ironically that
it might have been different ‘If I had done my broadcasts differently and if we had had a little more
of your support.’” Donald McLachlan, In the Chair: Barrington-Ward of The Times, 1927–1948 (Lon-
don, 1971), 209.
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at the time of its delivery, a negative view quickly cemented by the calm but
withering response made by Attlee the following day in his broadcast reply. The
reaction of Leo Amery, Churchill’s secretary of state for India, was a common
one: “Winston jumped straight off his pedestal as world statesman to deliver a
fantastical exaggerated onslaught on socialism.” He described Attlee’s broadcast
as “a very adroit quiet reply to Winston’s rodomontade.”3 Historians have offered
a similar verdict, almost unanimously. Churchill’s official biographer, not known
for his critical stance toward his subject, has described the speech’s references to
socialism as “hostile and injudicious.”4 Richard Cockett, in his detailed and sym-
pathetic account of the speech’s ideological origins, concedes that it was “clumsily
phrased” and lent a negative tone to the Tory campaign.5 Although the influence
of a single speech on an election is necessarily hard to quantify, and although
Churchill’s long-standing deficit in the opinion polls suggests he would probably
have lost anyway, there seems little reason to doubt the consensus view that the
speech harmed his election chances. Some might say that the case it advanced was
intellectually defensible, but, from the point of view of actually persuading un-
decided voters, it was a fiasco. It also did serious damage to his reputation.
The speech and the response to it are often seen together as a foundational
moment for the postwar British political settlement, the point when calm, mild-
mannered, unrhetorical Attlee skewered Churchill’s bombast and demonstrated
his own superior qualifications as a leader in time of peace.6 The central flaw of
the speech appears obvious. Between May 1940 and May 1945, Churchill himself
had worked with the leaders of the Labour Party who had taken ministerial roles
in his coalition government. Yet with only a slight qualification (“no doubt very
humanely directed in the first instance”), he now seemed to suggest that electing
them would lead to horrors equivalent to those perpetrated by the Nazis. There
was an appalling credibility gap, merely accentuated by the recent revelations of
the nature of concentration camps such as Belsen. However, if the standard view
of the speech cannot be rejected, it is also incomplete. Although leading Labour
politician Herbert Morrison immediately labeled it “Churchill’s crazy broadcast,”
it cannot be dismissed as a mere mental lapse.7 Contextualizing the “Gestapo”
comment within the speech as a whole may not vindicate Churchill, but it does
cast considerable light on his electoral strategy. The broadcast needs to be seen
as a failed attempt to appeal, in particular, to wavering Liberal voters. Examining
it in relation to contemporary political discourse more generally is also revealing.
Churchill’s suggestion that his opponents’ policies would lead to totalitarianism
struck many people at the time as profoundly transgressive. In fact, he was de-
ploying a trope that was very common, not least on the Labour side. The question,
3 John Barnes and David Nicholson, eds., The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929–1945
(London, 1988), 1046 (entries for 4 and 5 June 1945). The text, in fact, gives “rodomontage,” a clear
error.
4 Martin Gilbert, Never Despair: Winston S. Churchill, 1945–1965, vol. 8 of Winston S. Churchill
(London, 1988), 32.
5 Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-revolution,
1931–1983 (London, 1995), 94–96.
6 See, e.g., Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London, 1982), 255–56; and Peter Hennessy, Never Again:
Britain, 1945–1951 (London, 1993), 82–83.
7 “Churchill’s Crazy Broadcast,” Daily Herald, 5 June 1945.
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then, should not be why Churchill said something so outrageous. Rather, it should
be why Churchill was unable to get away with saying the sort of thing that many
of his opponents managed to say with impunity.
This article examines the speech, and contemporary reactions to it, from a
rhetorical perspective. This is a rather unusual angle to take in the study of post-
1945 British politics and may require some justification. Classicists, of course,
study rhetoric intensively. So do many scholars of the American political sys-
tem.8 In the British context, H. C. G. Matthew’s survey of developments in the
1860–1950 period stands as an important attempt to reclaim rhetoric as “an
essential concomitant of representative politics” and to describe the conditions
that facilitated its exercise in the great era of the mass meeting. Matthew’s ar-
gument, though, is that a healthy late Victorian rhetorical culture in the end wilted
in the face of new political and technological developments.9 This latter assumption
is questionable, but scholars of postwar Britain appear to have accepted it.10 They
do, of course, examine political language in a multitude of ways, many of them
very useful, but they rarely conceive of what they are doing explicitly as rhetorical
analysis.11 Indeed, those who write about political language often appear hostile
to the very concept of rhetoric, taking the term, which has long held very negative
connotations, to mean “just empty words,” a contrast to “substance.”12 Rhetoric
can, of course, be abused, but there is a powerful case to be made in its defense.13
In the context of this article, “rhetoric” refers specifically to political language
delivered orally, but the term is often used to include written discourse too. The
best-known definition of rhetoric comes from Aristotle, who described it as “the
faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion,” by which
he meant the capacity to select from an array of potential arguments those most
likely to convince the audience at hand.14 There is no evidence that Churchill was
thinking consciously about classical models in 1945, but he was certainly influenced
by the Western rhetorical tradition of which Aristotle was a founding father. Chur-
chill would certainly have agreed that the correct use of rhetoric can be a means,
in an imperfect world, of trying to harmonize reason and emotion in support of
desirable ends.
8 A key text is Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ, 1987). There are numerous
examples of post-1945 American political speech being subjected to rhetorical analysis—e.g., Ned
O’Gorman, “Eisenhower and the American Sublime,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 94, no. 1 (February
2008): 42–72.
9 H. C. G. Matthew, “Rhetoric and Politics in Britain, 1860–1950,” in Politics and Social Change
in Modern Britain, ed. P. J. Waller (Brighton, 1987), 34–58. Another notable example of discussion
of rhetoric in the run-up to 1945 is Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin: Conservative Leadership and
National Values (Cambridge, 1999), esp. the methodological statement at 13–18.
10 However, for a recent challenge to “technological determinism,” see Jon Lawrence, Electing Our
Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair (Oxford, 2009), esp. 97.
11 Exceptions are Jonathan Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor
(Basingstoke, 2005); and Ben Jackson, “The Rhetoric of Redistribution,” in In Search of Social De-
mocracy, ed. John Callaghan, Nina Fishman, Ben Jackson, and Martin McIvor (Manchester, 2009).
12 Norman Fairclough, New Labour, New Language? (London and New York, 2000), vii. Other
recent examples include Jamie Whyte, A Load of Blair (London, 2005); Peter Oborne, The Rise of
Political Lying (London, 2005); and Steven Poole, Unspeak: Words Are Weapons (London, 2007).
13 Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford, 1998).
14 Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton NJ,
1984), 2:2155.
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That ideal may seem to be the very antithesis of the unreasonable and unper-
suasive Gestapo speech, but the tools of rhetorical study can still be useful when
assessing what went wrong. Churchill had scaled the heights of rhetoric during
the early years of World War II; now he plunged to earth with an echoing crash.
His speeches, unlike those of most subsequent prime ministers, have been treated
to very extensive examination.15 Even the history of particular phrases has been
traced in detail.16 The focus, understandably, tends to be on his rhetorical successes,
yet the picture of his oratory is hardly complete unless his failures are also con-
sidered.17 This article conceives the Gestapo broadcast as a moment of rhetorical
crisis that illuminates the more profound political crisis that Churchill was facing.
As Michael Kandiah and others have noted, by the end of the war the Conservative
Party was up against serious difficulties. In addition to genuine (if retrospectively
exaggerated) organizational problems, it appeared to lack a clear policy and lead-
ership, with Churchill himself taking little interest in its affairs. Furthermore, the
growth of progressive opinion, signaled by by-election results and the popular
reception of the Beveridge Report on social services, opened ideological divisions
among Conservatives. The Tory Reform Group’s sympathy toward collectivist
policies was not shared by those skeptical of the growth of taxation and state
control.18 Churchill was not aware of how much a challenge he faced in seeking
reelection. Opinion polls predicted that he would lose, but he appears not to have
known this until after his defeat, and few other politicians took the surveys seriously
either. But although he expected to win, he had an understandable sense of fore-
boding about the postwar era, and his sense of unease about his electoral chances
grew throughout the campaign.19 Again, we need to invert the normal order of
priorities. Rather than asking what led Churchill to create a predicament for himself
through unwise use of language, we need to ask what it was about his political
predicament that led him to say something unwise. This is not to say that the
Gestapo speech did not deepen his existing troubles or that it did not contribute
to his loss of the election. However, it is to say that it was not merely a temporary
aberration of Churchill’s but was more broadly symbolic of his and his party’s loss
of political bearings. As his doctor observed after listening to the broadcast, “He
has a feeling that he is back in the thirties, alone in the world, speaking a foreign
tongue.”20
15 It is mainly his World War II speeches that have been examined, although his 1946 “iron curtain”
address has also received considerable attention. Churchill, then, forms only a partial exception to the
general neglect of post-1945 British political rhetoric.
16 For example, Manfred Weidhorn, “Churchill the Phrase Forger,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 58,
no. 2 (April 1972): 161–74; David Cannadine, In Churchill’s Shadow: Confronting the Past in Modern
Britain (London, 2003), chap. 4; Patrick Wright, Iron Curtain: From Stage to Cold War (Oxford,
2007); and John Lukacs, Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: The Dire Warning (New York, 2008).
17 For the importance of studying weak rhetoric, see Todd S. Frobish, ed., Crises in American Oratory:
A History of Rhetorical Inadequacy (Dubuque, IA, 2007).
18 Michael David Kandiah, “The Conservative Party and the 1945 General Election,” Contemporary
Record 9, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 22–47. See also Andrew Thorpe, Parties at War: Political Organization
in Second World War Britain (Oxford, 2009).
19 Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, 1940–1965 (London, 1968), 187, 254,
278, 309.
20 Ibid., 253.
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The speech needs to be understood in terms of Churchill’s desire to present
himself as the ideological heir of the near-defunct Liberal Party. Although he had
begun his political career as a Conservative, he switched to the Liberal Party in
1904. As a minister under H. H. Asquith before World War I, he was closely
associated with significant social reforms, such as the introduction of National
Insurance, and his reputation was closely bound up with that of his radical col-
league, David Lloyd George.21 After the fall of the Lloyd George coalition in 1922,
Churchill gravitated back toward the Conservative Party and in 1924 was ap-
pointed by the Conservative prime minister Stanley Baldwin as Chancellor of the
Exchequer. As Martin Daunton has argued, in this role, Churchill “consciously
seized the mantle of David Lloyd George” and aimed “to appropriate the ideology
of ‘new Liberalism’ which had, to a large extent, migrated into the Labour party.”22
(The inclusion of Churchill in the cabinet also helped reinforce Baldwin’s own
claim to represent “national” as opposed to sectional values.)23 It is notable that,
when discussing his own Liberal heritage in these and later years, Churchill gen-
erally talked most about social policy, Lloyd George, and the New Liberalism of
the pre-1914 period. However, when attacking Lloyd George’s own ambitious
plans to conquer unemployment during the 1929 election, Churchill accused the
Liberal Party of abandoning the canons of Gladstonian finance, which, he implied,
were now upheld by the Tories.
During Churchill’s 1930s wilderness years, the Liberal aspect of his identity
became dormant again, in spite of his efforts to collaborate with individual Liberals
in his fight against appeasement. It remained so during most of World War II. He
was good friends with the Liberal leader Archibald Sinclair, who was his secretary
of state for air, but he did have doubts about Sinclair’s leadership of the party and
felt that the Liberal party was overrepresented in the government in relation to
the small numbers it had in the Commons.24 The far more vocal and arguably
more authentic voice of wartime Liberalism was Sir William Beveridge. Churchill
viewed him as “an awful windbag and a dreamer.”25 This hostility, however, derived
substantially from the fact that Churchill viewed discussion of postwar social re-
construction—and the parliamentary difficulties that the Beveridge Report caused
his government—as a distraction from the war effort. He was not opposed to the
extension of welfare provision per se, and as the 1945 election approached, Chur-
chill rediscovered himself as a social reformer and as an heir to the Liberal tra-
dition.26 This was in line with the Conservative social reform tradition and with
21 Richard Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill: Rivals for Greatness (London, 2007).
22 Martin Daunton, Just Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914–1979 (Cambridge, 2002),
135.
23 See Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, 353, for Baldwin’s status “as a sort of honorary Liberal.”
24 Ian Hunter, ed., Winston and Archie: The Collected Correspondence of Winston Churchill and
Archibald Sinclair, 1915–1960 (London, 2005), 338, 412.
25 G. S. Harvie-Watt, Most of My Life (1980), 117, quoted in Kevin Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition
and Wartime Politics, 1940–1945 (Manchester, 1991), 119.
26 Richard Toye, “‘I am a Liberal as much as a Tory’: Winston Churchill and the Memory of 1906,”
Journal of Liberal History, no. 54 (Spring 2007): 38–45. See also Malcolm Baines, “The Liberal Party
and the 1945 General Election,” Contemporary Record 9, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 48–61.
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the party’s efforts, both before and after 1945, to appeal to Liberal opinion and
to ally itself with elements of the collapsing Liberal Party as they sheared off.27
Churchill’s efforts must also be seen as part of his bid to present himself as a
“national,” nonpartisan politician. This too was in line with previous leaders’ strat-
egies. There was an irony in this. When the National Government was formed in
1931, Churchill—denied ministerial office—was privately disparaging although
supportive of it in public. His high-profile campaigns against reform in India and
in favor of rearmament were seen by many, not without reason, as efforts to
destabilize it. A famous entry in the index of his Second World War memoirs
accused Baldwin, the government’s moving spirit, of putting party before coun-
try.28 Churchill’s own government of 1940, which stretched, as he boasted, “from
Lord Lloyd of Dolobran on the Right to Miss [Ellen] Wilkinson on the Left,”
had a much more plausible claim to being genuinely nonpartisan.29 However, he
jeopardized his own above-party status by accepting the leadership of the Con-
servative Party on the retirement of Neville Chamberlain. After VE-Day, the La-
bour Party and the majority of Liberal ministers withdrew from the coalition, yet
Churchill was determined to hang on to the “National” label nonetheless. The
irony lay in the fact that Churchill was linking himself to a brand that had paid
great dividends for Baldwin and Chamberlain. But because of the perceived failures
of the original National Government, it was a brand that was heavily devalued.
Churchill would struggle to overcome this, even though his credentials as a national
leader were apparently exceptional.
In March 1945, when it was already clear that Labour and the Liberals would
probably leave the coalition once victory in Europe was won, Churchill addressed
the Conservative Party conference in London. He declared: “Should it fall to me,
as it may do, to form a Government before the election, I shall seek the aid not
only of Conservatives but of men of good will of any party and no party who are
willing to serve and thus invest our Administration with a national character.”30
After Lord Croft (formerly Henry Page Croft, MP) wrote to congratulate him on
his speech, Churchill replied, explaining his thinking:
I do not intend a National Government founded on the official agreement of Labour
and Liberals, unless of course we are denied an effective working majority. But both
before and after the Election, I hope to have the help of eminent and capable men
who can do their various heavy jobs to the highest public advantage. As an old political
campaigner, you will realise the advantage of having “socialists v. the rest” rather than
“Tories v. the rest”. I imagine this is even more true in an election where there must
be an enormous vote unattached to any particular Party.31
When the coalition broke up in May, Churchill created a new Caretaker Govern-
ment. Inevitably, it was dominated by Conservatives. However, he also went to
27 E. H. H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism (Oxford, 2004), 253.
28 The entry read, “Baldwin, Rt. Hon Stanley . . . confesses putting party before country.” Churchill
did not write the entry himself, but it represented his view. David Reynolds, In Command of History:
Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (London, 2004), 94.
29 As recalled by Harold Macmillan, quoted in Betty D. Vernon, Ellen Wilkinson (London, 1982),
184.
30 Speech of 15 March 1945.
31 Winston Churchill to Lord Croft, 17 March 1945, Croft Papers, CAC, CRFT 1/8.
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considerable lengths to recruit non-Tories. One of these was the sixth earl of
Rosebery, son of Lord Rosebery, the former Liberal prime minister, who became
secretary of state for Scotland. Another was Lloyd George’s son Gwilym, who had
declared that he meant to fight the next election “as a Liberal candidate supporting
the National Government.”32 Leslie Hore-Belisha, appointed minister of National
Insurance, had originally been elected as a National Liberal but had become an
independent in 1942. He was to fight in the coming election (and lose) as a
National candidate. There were further similar examples. There were no Labour
representatives in his government; the vestigial National Labour Party was dissolved
in June 1945. However, in the Gestapo broadcast and in the election campaign
generally, Churchill would make much play with the government’s supposed “na-
tional” status. Strikingly, his election manifesto made no mention of the Conser-
vatives or of any other political party.33
It is no surprise, then, that The Times headlined its report of the Gestapo speech
“‘Vote National, Not Party.’”34 There was, however, a powerful disjuncture be-
tween Churchill’s claim that he and his colleagues transcended party and the
Gestapo comment itself, which sounded like a partisan political insult. Churchill
had a long history of engaging in such gibes. In 1920 he had described the Labour
Party as “simpletons” who worshipped Russia and were “unfit to govern the
country.” They stood, he said, “for a system of society where the whole business
of the country would have to be run by Government officials, under the direction
of ‘political bosses.’”35 During the 1935 election campaign, he claimed that “when
the air raids were on in the great war you could not get into the Tubes because
of Socialists scuttling into them like sewer rats.”36 In 1945 it was easy for Labour,
therefore, to portray him as reverting to type.
Churchill was, however, by no means the only politician to use “Gestapo” as
an insult. (He himself had been described as “Kaiser-like” at the Trades Union
Congress in 1926.)37 The term had long since entered the English language. The
Gestapo—a contraction of “Geheime Staatspolizei”—was founded in April 1933
and received its first mention in The Times on 13 October of that year. It received
over a thousand further mentions in the paper prior to Churchill’s 1945 broadcast,
the vast majority of them after 1939. At the outbreak of war, Bob Boothby, MP,
had written to Churchill deploring a list of government appointments “issued by
Margesson’s ‘Gestapo,’” the reference being to David Margesson, government
chief whip.38 By November 1940, Minister of Works John Reith and Labour War
Cabinet member Arthur Greenwood were referring to the prime minister’s Sta-
tistical Branch, with its habit of interference, as “Churchill’s Gestapo.”39 These,
32 “Major Lloyd-George’s Future,” The Times, 20 March 1945.
33 Churchill to Ralph Assheton, 11 June 1945, Churchill Papers, CAC, CHAR 2/554, fol. 14.
34 There were also smaller subheadings: “Prime Minister’s Broadcast Attack on Socialism” and “Policy
Abhorrent to British Ideas of Freedom.” The Times, 5 June 1945.
35 Speech of 14 February 1920.
36 “Socialists Ran like Rats,” Daily Express, 7 November 1935.
37 Report of Proceedings at the 58th Annual Trades Union Congress (London, 1926), 346. The speaker
was Ben Turner.
38 Robert Boothby to Churchill, 7 September 1939, in The Churchill War Papers, ed. Martin Gilbert,
3 vols. (New York and London, 1993–2000), 1:48.
39 Charles Stuart, ed., The Reith Diaries (London, 1975), 271.
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of course, were only private remarks. In December 1944, though, Greenwood
(who had by that point left the government) suggested in parliamentary debate
that British forces in Greece acting against the left-wing resistance movement were
being “driven into the position of a sort of Gestapo.”40
More significant was the long-standing Labour critique of Conservatism as a
kind of cryptofascism. In this analysis, the pretension to “national” values was
particularly suspicious, and the critique extended to the Tory Party’s allies. In
1937, Attlee attacked the philosophy of Ramsay MacDonald, Labour’s own former
leader, who had headed the National Government from 1931 to 1935: “Mac-
Donaldism is, in fact, essentially Fascist. MacDonald himself uses the same phrases
that may be found in the mouth of Hitler and Mussolini. He constantly draws a
distinction between party and national interests, the theory being that there is
really some ideal course to be followed for the good of the country and that party
politics are deflections caused by mere factiousness.”41 This is consistent with
Richard Overy’s recent observation that, during the period in question, the word
“fascism” was “increasingly used in a general sense to describe all political and
social tendencies which threatened to undermine political liberty and human rights,
either abroad or at home.” Overy also observes that “Hitler became the reference
point for so much of the discussion of crisis in the 1930s, a lightning conductor
for anxieties or expectations which were as much domestic in origin as they were
occasioned by German realities.”42 This continued into the war period. A number
of pamphlets that attacked the Tories claimed that there was a symbiosis between
Conservatism and fascism. Tom Wintringham (a former communist and founding
member of the Common Wealth Party) published Your MP in 1944. This pamphlet
sold over 200,000 copies.43 Wintringham wrote of how “inevitably Conservatism
turned towards Fascism, based hopes on it, accepted it as an ally—until its madness
broke into world war. And even then the Tories could not see it for what it was.”44
Aneurin Bevan, MP, wrote in the same year that “the Tory is a potential Fascist
element in the community.”45 The Conservatives’ 1930s foreign policy record
could be invoked in support of such arguments. The Labour Party’s 1945 Speaker’s
Handbook explained that “the Tories’ real policy all through was to let Fascist
aggressors get away with their crimes because they wanted to keep Fascism and
its oriental ally Japanese militarism strong enough to hold down the working class
in Europe and to bolster up Imperialism in Asia and Africa.” Conservatives had
been fully aware of fascist methods, including the concentration camps, which had
“flourished all through the years the Tories were coddling and appeasing their
friends Hitler and Mussolini.”46
The Handbook was published in June, the concentration camps having been
40 Arthur Greenwood, Speech to the House of Commons, 20 December 1944, Parliamentary De-
bates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 406 (1944–45), col. 1862.
41 C. R. Attlee, The Labour Party in Perspective (London, 1937), 60.
42 Richard Overy, The Morbid Age: Britain between the Wars (London, 2009), chap. 7, 274, 300.
43 Sheila Hodges, Gollancz: The Story of a Publishing House, 1928–1978 (London, 1978), 154.
44 Gracchus [Tom Wintringham], Your MP (London, 1944), 81.
45 Celticus [Aneurin Bevan], Why Not Trust the Tories? (London, 1944), 84.
46 The Labour Party, Speaker’s Handbook, 1945 (London, 1945), 179. See also Scott Kelly, “‘The
Ghost of Neville Chamberlain’: Guilty Men and the 1945 Election,” Conservative History Journal, no.
5 (Autumn 2005): 18–24.
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liberated between 11 April (Buchenwald) and 8 May (Mauthausen). It was the
liberation of Belsen on 15 April that made the strongest impression on the British
public mind. The conditions there, memorably reported by Richard Dimbleby
among others, were unspeakably horrific and had led to appalling numbers of
deaths through hunger, disease, and neglect; but, it should be noted, it was not
actually an extermination camp in the sense of there being a deliberate policy of
mass killing. The fact of the Jewish Holocaust had been reported in 1944, but,
in the absence of photographs and eyewitness testimony of the kind that now
emerged from Belsen, it did not sear itself into the British consciousness. Moreover,
the liberation of the camps was not understood at the time in the context of the
“Final Solution.” Left-wingers tended to view the camps in light of what had been
known about them in the 1930s—that is, that they had been used to repress Social
Democrats and other political opponents of the Nazis, even as the Conservative
policy of appeasement continued. In this context, Churchill’s Gestapo comment
was particularly inopportune. At this moment, socialists could be far more per-
suasively portrayed as the likely victims of Nazi-style political terror than as its
likely perpetrators. As Joanne Reilly has suggested, the news from the camps played
into Labour’s hands.47
Labour narratives did not, of course, go uncontested. Conservatives liked to
point out that the Nazis called themselves National Socialists. Basil Webb’s book
The House Divided (1945) was an attempted rebuttal of Your MP and included a
section on “Left Roads to Fascism.” Webb pointed to the record of Stafford
Cripps’s Socialist League, which had acted as a left-wing pressure group within
the Labour Party in the 1930s before being forcibly wound up. He echoed earlier
criticisms that Cripps’s plans for radical socialist transformation required dictatorial
methods: “The policy of the Socialist League meant dictatorship. But the threat
has not passed. The Socialist League is dissolved, it is true. But the hopes of the
old Socialist Leaguers still burn in many Left-Wing bosoms. There are still many
who cherish the spirit of National Socialism which the League embodied. National
Socialism—and all that it implies—is still only too great a danger.”48 A number
of Conservatives, following Churchill’s own lead in the Gestapo speech but also
deploying this established argument, would make claims like this during the course
of the election campaign.
Churchill himself was not immune from the left-wing charge of fascist sympa-
thies. In 1933, Cripps told the moderate Labour politician Hugh Dalton of his
belief that Churchill would defeat the National Government on the issue of India
before forming an administration that would “introduce fascist measures” and put
an end to general elections. Dalton thought that Cripps was talking nonsense.49
Far-left critics of Churchill, though, were able to point to various hostages to
fortune that he had given during the interwar years, especially his praise of Mus-
solini. In 1943, the New Leader, a small-circulation weekly published by the In-
dependent Labour Party, quoted an example of this dating from 1927. (When
H. G. Wells wrote to Downing Street urging that the story be contradicted, in
47 This paragraph draws on Joanne Reilly, Belsen: The Liberation of a Concentration Camp (London,
1998), esp. chap. 2.
48 Basil Webb, The House Divided (London, 1945), 45.
49 Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931–1945 (London, 1957), 41–42.
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the belief that Churchill had never said anything of the kind, a private secretary
replied, obligingly enclosing a cutting from The Times that showed that Churchill
had indeed spoken of being “charmed” by Mussolini’s “gentle and simple bearing”
and had said that Italian fascism had “rendered a service to the whole world.”)50
The New Leader would not be alone in developing such themes during the general
election. The Daily Herald, the Labour movement’s official paper, ran the headline
“A Vote for Churchill Is a Vote for Franco,” prefaced, in smaller letters, by “This
Is the Election Cry the Tory Organisers Fear.”51
It was not only extreme left-wingers who suggested that Churchill’s political
techniques were profoundly unsavory. In 1934, Churchill claimed that ministers
had abused parliamentary privilege by interfering with witnesses to the Select
Committee on Indian Reform. The complaint was rejected by the Committee of
Privileges. In the debate that followed, Sir John Simon, the foreign secretary, said
that Churchill’s “protests that all this had been done out of a passionate affection
for the purity of the law of Parliament really carry as much conviction as the
protests of Sir Oswald Mosley [leader of the British Union of Fascists] that the
brutalities of his uniformed bullies are all explained by a passionate attachment to
free speech.”52 In May 1945, Attlee publicly rejected the suggestion that the
coalition might be prolonged. Churchill had coupled that idea with a proposal to
hold a referendum on whether the life of the current parliament should be pro-
longed. “I could not consent to the introduction into our national life of a device
so alien to all our traditions as the referendum, which has only too often been
the instrument of Nazism and Fascism,” Attlee wrote. He added, “Hitler’s practices
in the field of referenda and plebiscites can hardly have endeared these expedients
to the British heart.”53 Sir Alan Lascelles, the king’s private secretary, wrote in his
diary that “Attlee was guilty of a great breach of taste (and of tactics) in suggesting
. . . that Winston’s suggestion of a referendum savoured of Hitlerite methods.”54
It may have been a breach of taste, but there is no reason to think that the tactic
backfired.
Thus, Churchill made his Gestapo charge at a time when other figures in both
main parties had been flinging similar insults and allegations around for some
while. In no case did any of these other instances become notorious or create a
media storm. This immediate context is important; in accounting for the Gestapo
speech, it is possible to overemphasize intellectual influences on Churchill at the
expense of other, cruder elements of contemporary discourse. Nevertheless, those
intellectual influences may have been important, and it is to them that we now
turn.
In 1935, F. A. Hayek, an Austrian e´migre´ economist based at the London School
of Economics, published Collectivist Economic Planning. This edited collection
was a pioneering work on the theory of planning that cast doubt on its practicality.
50 H. G. Wells to “The Private Secretary of Mr. Winston Churchill,” 29 July 1943, Wells Papers,
University of Illinois, WC-37-2; J. H. Peck to Wells, 14 August 1943, enclosing “Mr. Churchill on
Fascism,” The Times, 21 January 1927, Wells Papers, C-238-25.
51 Daily Herald, 18 June 1945.
52 “House of Commons,” The Times, 14 June 1934.
53 “July Election Nearer,” The Times, 22 May 1945.
54 Duff Hart-Davis, ed., King’s Counsellor: Abdication and War; The Diaries of Sir Alan Lascelles
(London, 2006), 327.
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Hayek’s colleague Lionel Robbins sent a copy to Churchill, recommending the
section dealing with the results of economic planning in Russia, but there is no
evidence that Churchill read it.55 Subsequently, in the face of new work on planning
theory, Hayek stopped arguing that planning was a technical impossibility and
instead claimed that it could not be implemented successfully without highly un-
desirable political and social consequences. In The Road to Serfdom (1944), Hayek
argued that political and personal freedom was contingent on freedom in economic
affairs, that there was no third course between an economic system based on free
enterprise and one based on totalitarianism, and that attempts by the state to plan
economic life would tend to the destruction of liberty. The book was a successful
work of popularization, but its ideas were not especially original.56 Indeed, elements
of its argument had been present in Conservative Party propaganda for some time.
For example, a 1929 poster warned voters that “Socialism would mean inspectors
all round” and advised them that “If you want to call your soul your own, vote
Conservative.”57
Hayek later wrote ruefully that “I am afraid there can be little doubt that Winston
Churchill’s somewhat unfortunately phrased Gestapo speech was written under
the influence of The Road to Serfdom.”58 During 1944, he himself made two efforts
to get the book into Churchill’s hands. In March he sent Churchill a copy.59 In
October, he lunched with the Conservative MP Waldron Smithers and asked him
“most earnestly” to send Churchill a (further) copy. This Smithers did, suggesting
that the prime minister could get the book’s gist from the introduction and noting
the “tremendous interest” it had aroused in the country.60 Again, however, it is
unclear whether Churchill actually read Hayek’s book himself. Cockett suggests,
plausibly, that Churchill may have been influenced by Hayek secondhand via Con-
servative Party Chairman Ralph Assheton. Assheton was so impressed by The Road
to Serfdom that he bought fifty copies and sent them to colleagues and also to
Attlee and Herbert Morrison. In April 1945, Assheton made a speech that not
only had a clear Hayekian tinge but also associated Labour’s policies with Nazi
dictatorship, via a xenophobic take on Marx. “We in this country have been fighting
against totalitarianism in Germany and we do not wish to adopt as our creed the
German-made doctrines of Karl Marx,” he said. “I do not think that most of those
who toy with Socialist theories and doctrines in this country sufficiently realise
that Socialism . . . inevitably leads to a totalitarian State.” He sent his text in
advance to Churchill, who thought it “very good.”61
It is certainly possible that Assheton’s speech had an impact on Churchill. After
the Gestapo broadcast, Emrys Hughes, editor of the socialist weekly Forward,
55 Lionel Robbins to Churchill, 15 February 1935, Churchill Papers, CHAR 2/234, fol. 65.
56 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 79
57 The Bodleian Library, Oxford, has a collection of Conservative Party posters, including this one,
available online at http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/cpa/.
58 F. A. Hayek to Paul Addison, 13 April 1980, quoted in Paul Addison, Churchill on the Home
Front, 1900–1955 (London, 1992), 383.
59 Hayek to “The Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,” 15 March 1944, Churchill
Papers, CHAR 2/253, fol. 17.
60 Waldron Smithers to Churchill, 9 October 1944, Churchill Papers, CHAR 2/497, fol. 31.
61 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 92–93.
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noted that Assheton had started a trend of linking Labour with totalitarianism.62
It is worth remembering though that Churchill, in his 1920 speech quoted above,
had previously attacked socialism as leading to authoritarian rule. It is also worth
noting that, as Ben Jackson has argued, The Road to Serfdom should not be seen
as simply a first installment of the rise of the Thatcherite New Right. Hayek (who
saw himself as a Liberal rather than a Conservative) objected to full-scale centrally
planned socialism, not to all forms of welfare legislation.63 If this is understood,
it is easier to see how Churchill could make use of Hayekian ideas in the Gestapo
speech while simultaneously championing social reform.64 The speech was to in-
clude appeals to two competing strains of Liberalism that, to him, did not nec-
essarily appear incompatible. He was not, in fact, the most extreme person on the
National side. Rowland Hunt, general secretary of the National Liberals, argued
not long before Churchill’s broadcast that the proposals of Beveridge were contrary
to Liberalism and “if adopted would be Hitler’s last triumph, for Britain would
then become a completely totalitarian state.”65
  
Churchill wrote the speech at Chequers over the weekend of 2–3 June. Although
many people, when they heard it, suspected the involvement of his cronies Lord
Beaverbrook and Brendan Bracken, MP, it was his own work.66 There is no sur-
viving account of how Churchill came to light upon the Gestapo phrase. According
to his youngest daughter, though, his wife warned him not to use it: “Clementine,
to whom he had shown the script of his broadcast, spotted this unfortunate sen-
tence at once, and she had begged Winston to delete the odious and invidious
reference to the Gestapo. But he would not heed her.”67 After the war he expressed
a note of private regret—while defending the speech as a whole—that he had had
to refer to the Gestapo rather than to the Soviet NKVD, the forerunner of the
KGB.68 At the time that he made the broadcast, he was already highly concerned
62 Emrys Hughes, “‘Gestapo Will Get You,’” Forward, 9 June 1945.
63 Ben Jackson, “At the Origins of Neo-liberalism: The Free Economy and the Strong State, c.
1930–1947,” Historical Journal 53 (2010): 129–51. For Hayek’s belief in a “minimum income,” see
F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1944; repr., London, 1962), 89.
64 Harriet Jones has noted the apparent tensions in the Conservative election message, suggesting
that the manifesto had a “basic lack of consistency represented in the simultaneous advocacy of social
reform and financial orthodoxy” (Harriet Jones, “The Conservative Party and the Welfare State,
1942–1955” [PhD thesis, University of London, 1992], 108–9, quoted in Kandiah, “Conservative
Party,” 33).
65 New Horizon, April 1945, quoted in David Dutton, Liberals in Schism: A History of the National
Liberal Party (London, 2008), 142. Similar arguments, directed at Labour’s nationalization plans, were
made by some grassroots Conservatives. See Thorpe, Parties at War, 176.
66 John Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939–1955 (London, 1985), 606.
Colville told Lascelles that “the only share the Beaver had had in it was the deletion of a tribute to
Ernie Bevin,” the trade unionist and former minister of labour. Nevertheless, the speech did make a
mildly positive reference to Bevin’s demobilization scheme. See Hart-Davis, King’s Counsellor, 331.
67 Mary Soames, Clementine Churchill (Harmondsworth, 1981), 545.
68 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 94. However, Churchill was not completely consistent in his
defense of the speech. When at last introduced to Hayek after the war, Churchill told him that his
arguments in The Road to Serfdom were right but that “it would never happen in England,” which of
course contradicted his own argument in 1945. Hayek to Addison, 13 April 1980, quoted in Addison,
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about Soviet geopolitical ambitions, first using the phrase “iron curtain” in cor-
respondence with President Truman on 12 May. (He believed, however, that a
personal meeting with Stalin might help achieve an East-West understanding.)69
He was, of course, constrained from offering public criticism by the fact that Britain
and the Soviet Union were still allies. In the domestic context, moreover, it must
have seemed doubtful that traditional “red scare” tactics could be as effective
against Labour as they had been in 1924 and 1931, given the Soviet Union’s
recently found popularity with much of the British public, which reflected ad-
miration for the efforts of the Red Army. Nonetheless, his actual choice of words
implicitly linked Stalinism with Nazism, because he was arguing that all socialist
systems would require a Gestapo. Therefore, his speech can be seen as part of the
process by which British reactions to prewar and wartime fascism and postwar
communism became fused, with the Soviet Union replacing Germany as the threat
to “civilization” in the early stages of the cold war.70
On Monday, 4 June, Churchill delivered the broadcast in the study at Chequers.
It lasted twenty-one minutes and fifteen seconds.71 His private secretary, John
Colville, observed that “he was speaking against the clock which made him hurry
unduly.”72 Churchill devoted his first few paragraphs to his regret at the breakup
of the coalition. “I know that many of my Labour colleagues would have been
glad to carry on,” he said. He did concede that political parties had always played
a great role in British affairs: “Party ties have been considered honourable bonds,
and no one could doubt that when the German war was over and the immediate
danger to this country, which had led to the Coalition, had ceased, conflicting
loyalties would arise.” But he immediately went on to suggest that being bound
by such ties was, in the current circumstances, dishonorable: “Our Socialist and
Liberal friends felt themselves forced, therefore, to put party before country. They
have departed and we have been left to carry the nation’s burden.” Churchill could
certainly have relied on most of his listeners to accept his unstated axiom that it
was wrong to put party before country. In his reference to “the nation’s burden,”
there was an echo of the charge leveled against the Labour Party in 1931 that it
had run away from its responsibilities during the financial crisis that triggered the
creation of the National Government. It is, of course, common for politicians to
describe office as a burden even when they themselves are not in the least inclined
to give it up.
Churchill then expounded his claim that his Caretaker administration was a
National Government. He said, “I claim the support of all throughout the country
who sincerely put the nation first in their thoughts.” This was an ambiguous
remark. Was he claiming he already had it, or was he merely claiming it in the
sense of asking for it? At any rate, it carried the strong implication that those who
did not support him were not sincerely putting the nation first. He himself, he
69 Churchill to Harry S. Truman, 12 May 1945, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States: Diplomatic Papers; The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, 2 vols.
(Washington, DC, 1960), 1:8–9.
70 Overy, Morbid Age, chap. 7, 265–313; Ann Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division
of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford, 1993), 221.
71 Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, vol. 4, Sound and Vision (Oxford,
1979), 627 n. 4.
72 Colville, Fringes of Power, 606.
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said, would stand as a “Conservative and National” candidate: “Others may choose
to call themselves National or National Liberal, and those who give us their support
should vote National rather than Party on polling day.” Perhaps Churchill felt he
was on weak ground, because he then spent several more sentences arguing that
the government really was a National one. At the least, he was not able to take
it for granted that his claim would be accepted automatically. This section of the
broadcast was largely concerned with making an ethical appeal—that is to say, an
appeal based on the ethos, or character, of the speaker. Churchill presented himself
and his colleagues as men who, by selflessly shouldering the burden of office, were
already putting the national interest first. They could therefore be trusted to do
so in the future.
Next, he turned to the Liberals: “Particularly do I regret the conduct of the
Liberal Party. Between us and the orthodox Socialists there is a great doctrinal
gulf, which yawns and gapes. . . . There is no such gulf between the Conservative
and National Government I have formed and the Liberals. There is scarcely a
Liberal sentiment which animated the great Liberal leaders of the past which we
do not inherit and defend.” In order to justify this point, he referred both to his
government’s “championship of freedom” and to the Four-Year Plan for postwar
reconstruction that he had outlined in March 1943. This included proposals for
a National Health Service and for cradle-to-grave national insurance. However,
Churchill did not now reiterate any of these details, appearing to assume that his
audience was already familiar with the plan. He asserted that the program of social
reform it contained was “so massive, so warm, so adventurous” that Gladstone
would have felt it was going too far. “But we still have a Rosebery and a Lloyd-
George to carry forward the flags of their fathers.” Rather surprisingly, although
he mentioned these family connections of members of his government, he failed
to comment on his own concrete record of reform or his past association with
Lloyd George.
Having explained how much in common Liberals had with his government,
Churchill faced the tricky task of explaining why the Liberal Party had “spurned”
him and his colleagues by withdrawing from the coalition. (During the war he
had pressed without success for Liberal reunion and must have been aware that
Sinclair’s independent Liberals had been divided on whether to continue the co-
alition.) His explanation verged on the comic: “I am sorry to tell you that they
have yielded to the tactical temptation, natural to politicians, to acquire more seats
in the House of Commons, if they can, at all costs.” The Liberals, it seemed, had
left office out sheer self-interest in spite of agreeing with the Conservatives on
every significant ideological point! After attacking the Liberal leaders, Churchill
attempted to win over their supporters. He appeared to assume that Liberals were,
in fact, likely to vote Labour. He appealed to them to ask themselves whether his
government “has not more claim on their ancestral loyalties than has a Socialist
administration, whose principles are the absolute denial of traditional Liberalism.”
It was here that he segued into his philosophical denunciation of socialism, which
he combined with an assault on Labour’s Liberal credentials: “My friends, I must
tell you that a Socialist policy is abhorrent to the British ideas of freedom. Although
it is now put forward in the main by people who have a good grounding in the
Liberalism and Radicalism of the early part of this century, there can be no doubt
that Socialism is inseparably interwoven with Totalitarianism and the abject worship
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of the State.” At this point, the language of the speech became increasingly vivid,
even lurid. Through such language, although ostensibly appealing to logos (reason),
he also made an appeal to pathos (emotion). He argued that socialism challenged
not only property but all forms of liberty and, to illustrate this, spoke of socialists’
“hunger for controls of every kind, as if these were delectable foods instead of
war-time inflictions and monstrosities.” Under socialism, he said, all would be
forced to obey the state in every act of life. He then talked about the state as
though it were a person. It would be “the arch-employer, the arch-planner, the
arch-administrator and ruler, and the arch-caucus-boss.” He then shifted his im-
agery, invoking the pathetic spectacle of “an ordinary citizen or subject of the
King” contending with “this formidable machine.” Later still in the speech, the
state became “this mighty organism.”
A complete socialist state, he continued, would be unable to tolerate opposition.
He used some rolling phrases of the kind for which he was well known, linking
patriotic sentiment with his abstract argument: “Here in old England, in Great
Britain, of which old England forms no inconspicuous part, in this glorious Island,
the cradle and citadel of free democracy throughout the world, we do not like to
be regimented and ordered about and have every action of our lives prescribed
for us.” Socialism, moreover, was an attack “upon the right of the ordinary man
or woman to breathe freely without having a harsh, clumsy, tyrannical hand clapped
across their mouths and nostrils.” Citing proposals made by both Morrison and
Cripps to increase the efficiency of Parliament by curtailing debate on the details
of policy, he claimed that “a Free Parliament is odious to the Socialist doctrinaire.”
He then went further and said that “no Socialist system can be established without
a political police.” He acknowledged that many advocates of socialism would be
“horrified” at this suggestion. “That is because they are short-sighted, that is
because they do not see where their theories are leading them.”
Then came the crucial passage:
No Socialist Government conducting the entire life and industry of the country could
afford to allow free, sharp, or violently worded expressions of public discontent. They
would have to fall back on some form of Gestapo, no doubt very humanely directed
in the first instance. And this would nip opinion in the bud; it would stop criticism
as it reared its head, and it would gather all the power to the supreme party and the
party leaders, rising like stately pinnacles above their vast bureaucracies of civil servants,
no longer servants and no longer civil.
The image of the party leaders as “stately pinnacles” was a pleasing one. The
remark about civil servants was also gratifying to the ear, gaining power from the
repetition and reversal of words, neatly reinforcing the idea of reversal of the
function of officials, from servants to tyrants. The power of the “Gestapo” phrase
came in part from the fact that it brought the alleged threat to freedom alive in
a way that an abstract word such as “fascism” was unlikely to achieve. But the
comment’s infelicity was obvious, and this was actually increased by Churchill’s
use of the qualifying phrase “no doubt very humanely directed in the first instance.”
This was clearly an attempt to further convey that socialists did not intend to
introduce a horrific state of affairs but would be forced to do so over time by the
logic of their own doctrines. However, the idea of a “humanely directed” Gestapo
was self-contradictory. If a socialist government’s methods of control were initially
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humane—no matter what they might later descend into—they could not at that
point be considered equivalent to those of the Gestapo. And if they were equivalent
to those of the Gestapo, then they could not be considered humane. After all, the
Gestapo’s history was not that of a well-intentioned organization gone wrong.
Churchill went on to anticipate a potential objection (a rhetorical maneuver
known as “prolepsis”). To do this, he addressed the listener directly, putting into
his or her mouth a rhetorical question: “But, you will say, look at what has been
done in the war. Have not many of those evils which you have depicted been the
constant companions of our daily life?” To this he replied that it was true that
quasi-socialist conditions had been a necessity during the emergency conditions
of war. “We all submit to being ordered about to save our country,” he said. “But
when the war is over and the imminent danger to our existence is removed, we
cast off these shackles and burdens which we imposed upon ourselves in times of
dire and mortal peril, and quit the gloomy caverns of war and march out into the
breezy fields, where the sun is shining and where all may walk joyfully in its warm
and golden rays.” The metaphor of emergence from the dark was reminiscent of
his speech of 18 June 1940, in which he had spoken of the possibility that if Hitler
were defeated, the world could “move forward into broad, sunlit uplands.” It was
a rare moment of relief in a broadcast that contained few light spots.
Churchill’s assault on Labour was not yet complete. He turned to the party’s
plans to nationalize the Bank of England. Once a socialist government began
“monkeying with the credit of Britain,” no one’s nest egg would be safe, he
argued.73 This was an echo of the charge leveled in 1931 that the return of Labour
would endanger savings held in the Post Office Bank. Churchill drew attention
to Greenwood’s remark in February 1943 that pounds, shillings, and pence had
become “meaningless symbols.” (Greenwood’s point had been that true wealth
derived from the real economy rather than from finance.)74 Churchill said that “all
this ‘meaningless symbol’ talk is very dangerous” and that it would lead to the
debauchment of the currency. His own government stood for maintaining the
value of the pound, he said, “and we would rather place upon all classes, rich and
poor alike, the heaviest burden of taxation they can bear than slide into the delirium
of inflation.” Here was another echo of 1931 and the talk then of “equality of
sacrifice” across classes. Warning that electing him offered “no guarantee of lush
and easy times ahead,” Churchill also gave a minor reprise of his “blood, toil,
tears and sweat” speech of 13 May 1940. Under him, pounds, shillings, and pence
would not become meaningless symbols, he promised: “On the contrary, our
resolve will be that what has been earned by sweat, toil and skill or saved by self-
denial shall command the power to buy the products of peace at an equal value
in sweat, toil and skill.” He then justified having engaged in a long disquisition
on socialism versus individualism, on the grounds that he had been forced into
it. “That is because for the first time the challenge has been made, in all formality,
73 In fact, Churchill did not oppose the nationalization of the bank when the new government
legislated for this in 1946. Hugh Dalton, High Tide and After: Memoirs, 1945–1960 (London, 1962),
45.
74 Greenwood, Speech to the House of Commons, 16 February 1943, Parliamentary Debates, Com-
mons, 5th ser., vol. 386 (1942–43), col. 1624.
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‘Socialism versus the rest.’” This, of course, was the theme that he had earlier
identified in his letter to Croft.
The concluding section of the broadcast referred to the problems of demobil-
ization and to Britain’s weakened economic position. “What a mad thing it would
be to slash across this whole great business of resettlement and reorganization
with these inflaming controversies of Socialistic agitation!” Churchill said. He
contrasted the “vast revolutionary change” supposedly represented by Labour’s
plans with his own proposals for “practical and immediate action.” His peroration
further emphasized the importance of practicality, combining the military themes
of marching and returning warriors with a cozy vision of domesticity: “On with
the forward march! Leave these Socialist dreamers to their Utopias or their night-
mares. Let us be content to do the heavy job that is right on top of us. And let
us make sure that the cottage home to which the warrior will return is blessed
with modest but solid prosperity, well fenced and guarded against misfortune, and
that Britons remain free to plan their lives for themselves and for those they love.”
The reference to “the cottage home” might have seemed misplaced in a country
so heavily urbanized as Britain. Admittedly, Baldwin, whose career had ended only
a few years beforehand, had made highly successful use of rural imagery; this was
part of his ethical appeal, that of a plain man of the people, who could be trusted
because he was not “clever.”75 But if the high-living and mentally frenetic Churchill
was aiming to emulate this homespun technique, he did not do so successfully.
Ross McKibbin has argued persuasively that in the interwar years the Conservative
Party had successfully appealed to the Liberal nonconformist base by toning down
its own language: “Many of its older, rhetorically aggressive traditions were aban-
doned in favour of a more reticent and sanctimonious style,” which Baldwin per-
sonified.76 In spite of the quasi-Baldwinian “National” elements of the Gestapo
speech, it was also blatantly aggressive. Arguably, Churchill was returning to the
platform techniques he had learned in his youth, having assimilated only partially
the lessons that Baldwin’s example could teach.
Indeed, it is tempting to draw parallels between the Gestapo speech and late
nineteenth-century popular Toryism of the kind described by Jon Lawrence. The
working man’s right to live his life free from interference by busybodies (especially
in regard to alcohol) had then been a classic theme. However, we may also note
some important differences. For as long as the Liberal Party remained strong,
Conservatives assaulted its principles head on, arguing that its commitment to
laissez-faire meant that only Tories could be trusted to deliver legislation in the
interests of the workers.77 But in 1945, with the Liberal Party on its last legs,
Churchill chose (as in the 1920s) to reach out to its supporters by claiming to
embrace its values. He presented Conservatism and Liberalism as allies, not an-
tagonists, in the face of the greater socialist threat. Paradoxically, this putative
alliance in defense of “freedom” was made easier by the fact that Liberalism itself
had moved some way from laissez-faire.
75 See Williamson, Stanley Baldwin.
76 Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England, 1918–1951 (Oxford, 1998), 96.
77 Jon Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867–1914
(Cambridge, 1998), esp. 106–7.
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The day after the broadcast, Churchill was greeted in the House of Commons
by ironic cries of “Where’s the Gestapo?”78 Some Conservative MPs were buoyed
up by the speech. “Chips” Channon thought that “the Labour boys seem very
depressed and dejected by Winston’s trouncing” and noted that his own colleagues
were “cock-a-hoop.” Nevertheless, he thought their optimism was excessive.79
Cuthbert Headlam’s opinion was that the speech “rather overdid the business I
thought, so far as sensible people are concerned—but then there are few sensible
people and the rank and file of the party may welcome a fighting speech from the
leader.”80 Journalists quickly began to report that some Tories were unhappy,
although the Manchester Guardian’s parliamentary correspondent suggested that
Churchill’s own good mood at Question Time indicated that he felt the broadcast
had gone well.81 Press comment tended to divide on predictable lines, but the
contrast in coverage provided by two left-wing papers is interesting. In an astute
move, the Daily Herald reported Churchill’s speech quite fully, interspersed with
rebuttals offered by Herbert Morrison. The paper took Morrison’s “crazy broad-
cast” remark for its main headline.82 The Daily Mirror, for its part, ran “Jap Spy
Pigeons to Face Falcon Terror” as its chief story, with “Churchill Claims He Is
Leading National Govt.” relegated further down the page. Although it reported
accurately the gist of his attack on socialism, the Gestapo comment itself was
omitted.83 By any standards, this was shoddy journalism: either the writer had
failed to spot the most newsworthy quotation or he or she deliberately held it
back in the (as it turned out, false) belief that it was damaging to Labour.
Attlee’s reply to Churchill was broadcast on the evening of 5 June. Several parts
of it were in the form of direct rejoinders to the prime minister, notably the
masterful opening passage:
When I listened to the Prime Minister’s speech last night, in which he gave such a
travesty of the policy of the Labour Party, I realized at once what was his object. He
wanted the electors to understand how great was the difference between Winston
Churchill, the great leader in war of a united nation, and Mr. Churchill, the party
leader of the Conservatives. He feared lest those who had accepted his leadership in
war might be tempted out of gratitude to follow him further. I thank him for having
disillusioned them so thoroughly. The voice we heard last night was that of Mr.
Churchill, but the mind was that of Lord Beaverbrook.84
Here, Attlee skillfully combined the sarcastic suggestion that Churchill was delib-
erately undermining his own electoral chances with the powerful idea that there
were two Winston Churchills. This was a trope that was to be taken up by other
Labour speakers and, in the aftermath of the election, was represented visually in
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a famous cartoon by David Low.85 As Mary Soames has put it, praiseworthy war-
leader Churchill was contrasted with reprehensible party-leader Churchill, the latter
portrayed as “irresponsible, out of touch with ordinary people, subject to the
malign influence of Lord Beaverbrook, and not to be trusted in peacetime.”86
Beaverbrook was a press magnate with a reputation as an evil genius. Attlee’s
suggestion that he had inspired Churchill’s broadcast resonated strongly. The
Daily Herald, reporting Attlee’s speech, gave a visual representation of it at the
top of its front page: “The Voice Was the Voice of [arrow pointing to photo of
Churchill] but the Mind Was the Mind of [arrow pointing to photo of Beaver-
brook].”87 Attlee had managed to undermine Churchill’s apparently impregnable
character-based claims, not via a direct assault but by exploiting the perceived
negative character of somebody else.
Attlee was similarly adroit when he dealt directly with the Gestapo passage. He
pointed out that Scandinavian countries as well as Australia and New Zealand had
elected left-wing governments without dreadful consequences.88 He added: “I shall
not waste time on this theoretical stuff, which seems to me to be a secondhand
version of the academic views of an Austrian professor—Friedrich August von
Hayek—who is very popular just now with the Conservative Party.”89 This suggests
that he may well have read the copy of The Road to Serfdom that Assheton had
sent him. (Morrison had definitely read it, as had key Labour intellectuals.)90
Richard Cockett has observed that Attlee “subtly” emphasized “Hayek’s foreign
origins to persuade his listeners that Hayek was nothing more than a mad foreign
professor who did not understand the English way of doing things.”91 This is true
enough. Attlee, though, was himself contending with claims, such as those made
by Assheton, that socialism’s allegedly Germanic origins rendered it suspicious.
Churchill’s own reference to “this continental conception of human society called
Socialism” had been very much in that vein.92 Attlee’s broadcast provoked some
press interest in Hayek (although the coverage of him was more limited than
Cockett implies).93 “I wrote the book essentially to persuade the Socialists to act
wisely, but I do not seem to have succeeded in that,” he told the Daily Telegraph.
85 Published on 31 July 1945 in the Evening Standard, the cartoon was called “The Two Churchills.”
It showed one Churchill, “the leader of humanity,” sitting on a pedestal, commiserating with the other
one, “the party leader,” down below. “Cheer up!” the former tells the latter. “They will forget you but
they will remember me always.”
86 Soames, Clementine Churchill, 545.
87 Daily Herald, 6 June 1945.
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Is Insulted,” Reynolds News, 10 June 1945; and F. A. Cooper, “Where Labour Has Ruled for 27 Years
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Queensland, of which he was premier.
89 “Labour Case for Socialism,” The Times, 6 June 1945.
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91 Cockett, Thinking The Unthinkable, 5.
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93 Cockett suggests that “the press descended” on Hayek and that he gained “star-status” in the
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“I have no connection with the Conservative Party.”94 He told Beaverbrook’s
Daily Express, however, that he was delighted “if any party has the wisdom to
profit” from The Road to Serfdom, which implies that he did not disapprove of
Churchill’s broadcast at the time.95
In the final section of his speech, Attlee contested Churchill’s claim that his
government was a “National” one. Not only was the government a Conservative
government, he argued, but the Conservative Party was “a class Party” that had
rarely drawn any MPs from “the ranks of the wage-earners” and continued to
represent “property and privilege.” Moreover, “The Labour Party is, in fact, the
one party which most nearly reflects in its representation and composition all the
main streams which flow into the great river of our national life.”96 This was a
neat attempt to reclaim the “national” label from the Tories, and it fell in with a
long-established effort to present Labour’s patriotic credentials to the electorate,
which was also reflected in the Labour manifesto “Let Us Face the Future.”97 It
did, though, give the Express the chance to caption its account of his talk with
the insinuating headline “The National Socialists.”98
  
Many individuals left records of their reactions to the exchange between Chur-
chill and Attlee. A considerable number of these people were MPs or other elite
figures. For example, Churchill’s good friend, the Liberal politician Violet Bonham
Carter, wrote in her diary on 4 June, “Have just heard W’s broadcast which really
does lay it on a bit thick!” Two days later, she wrote, “Attlee gave a good &
dignified & reasoned & constructive reply to Winston.”99 After listening to Attlee,
Leo Amery’s son Julian, himself a Conservative candidate, “had considerable
searchings of heart” regarding his political allegiance.100 Margaret Thatcher recalled
in her memoirs: “I vividly remember sitting in the student common room in
Somerville [College, Oxford] listening to Churchill’s famous (or notorious) elec-
tion broadcast . . . and thinking, ‘he’s gone too far.’ However logically unassailable
the connection between socialism and coercion was, in our present circumstances
the line would not be credible.”101 George Bernard Shaw was unusual in providing
an extended, albeit slightly eccentric, analysis of Churchill’s rhetoric. He did not
hesitate to brand the speech a fiasco but was more sympathetic in his treatment
than were many others on the Left. “He was as good as ever on his own ground
of romantic militarism,” Shaw argued. He added: “As a pre-Marxian glory mer-
chant he has been a first-rate entertainer all through, and has kept up the spirit
of the nation quite splendidly. Unhappily, when he was nearly through his broadcast
94 “Prof. Von Hayek,” Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, 6 June 1945.
95 “The Road to Serfdom,” Daily Express, 6 June 1945.
96 “Labour Case for Socialism,” The Times, 6 June 1945.
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History Review 67, no. 2 (August 2002): 171–85.
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after a prosperous voyage, his party pilots queered his compass and misled him
on to the rocks of up-to-date matter-of-fact unromantic policy, of which he knows
much less than nothing. In a moment the eloquent patriotic orator became a
raving Anarchist tub-thumper, modern only in his trick of calling policemen Ge-
stapos.”102 Shaw painted the speech as absurd rather than—as might have been
expected in the immediate aftermath of Belsen—obscene. In this he was at one
with Churchill’s other left-wing critics. They did not describe the broadcast as a
disgusting insult to the victims of fascism. Rather, they depicted it as “crazy”—
cheap and semicomic, sad and undignified—but, at the same time, as predictable
given the Conservatives’ previous record of election “scares.” Some adopted an
in-sorrow-not-in-anger approach, in which Churchill was pitied rather than ex-
coriated.103 And, as Attlee’s broadcast showed, ridicule was a highly effective
weapon. A cartoon in the Daily Herald on 6 June 1945 provides another telling
example of this. It depicted a soldier on crutches contemplating a poster, with the
legend “Only Conservatives are National—Churchill.” The man mused: “So it
seems I haven’t been fighting for my country after all.”
The reactions of ordinary voters to the speech were broadly negative. The speech
was listened to by a high proportion of voters; according to Asa Briggs, Churchill’s
four election broadcasts reached an average of 49 percent of the potential total
audience.104 It is not known how many read it in the papers the next day; there
was doubtless a considerable degree of overlap between listeners and readers.
Although the latter experienced it in a mediated form, there is no evidence to
suggest that reactions differed greatly depending on whether the speech was heard
or read. Some interesting reactions were captured through the work of the research
organization Mass-Observation (MO).105 Mass-Observation had pioneered qual-
itative political opinion research in Britain.106 According to MO’s report on the
election, “It would be difficult to exaggerate the disappointment and genuine
distress aroused by this speech.” The report reproduced a large number of ob-
servations from citizens, many along the lines of this: “The whole speech seems
to have been in bad taste. No one but the veriest baby in politics would believe
his assumption that the Labour Leaders are potential Gestapo officials.” Attlee’s
contribution was often viewed positively—for example, this comment: “It was a
fair speech and very truthful. He didn’t use any election stunting.” But the ex-
istence of these negative reactions should not be allowed to obscure that of more
positive ones. Mass-Observation’s report noted that the question “Which speeches
on the wireless or in the papers did you like best?” found more people preferring
Churchill’s speech to that of any other single speaker. However, unlike those who
preferred other speakers, these respondents tended not to give concrete reasons
for their preference. They offered reasons such as “I’ve always listened to all his
speeches” and “He is a great man, and we should listen to him.” The report
argued that “This type of reply indicates a simple loyalty that transcends criticism;
102 George Bernard Shaw, “Churchill’s Fiasco,” Forward, 16 June 1945.
103 See Morrison’s comments in “Churchill’s Crazy Broadcast,” Daily Herald, 5 June 1945.
104 Briggs, History of Broadcasting, 627.
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and it was the conflict between this feeling and the rational disapproval and dis-
agreement that his actual statements aroused which formed one of the keynotes
of the election.”107 This remark may well be thought to reveal the report’s pro-
Labour bias. It should also be noted that Labour’s Gallup poll lead declined from
16 percent on 28 May to 9 percent on 18 June, although we should hesitate to
attribute this to the impact of Churchill’s speech, given that 69 percent of those
interviewed by Gallup thought it “bad.”108
Presumably, voters were not just influenced by one speech but were also affected
by the rest of the campaign, hence the importance of the ways in which other
politicians took up the Gestapo theme. The Nuffield survey of the 1945 election
noted that many of Churchill’s supporters followed him in attacking “‘Socialism’
in the abstract rather than the published programme of the Labour party. In so
doing, they nearly always went on to blacken Socialists as anti-democrats and
friends of Fascism.” The authors provided examples, including that of Harold
Balfour, who said (on 15 June) that “the Socialist State of Cripps is to be the
same as the Fascist state of the blackshirts.”109 At an even more extreme level,
Howard Leicester, National candidate at Bethnal Green South-West, prepared a
circular that said: “A Socialist State needs a Gestapo and Concentration Camps.
Think this over and remember Belsen.”110 The so-called “Laski scare”—the alle-
gation that the Labour Party National Executive Committee, under its chairman
Harold Laski, would dictate policy to an Attlee government—was an attempt to
extend the Gestapo theme. Some Tory candidates referred to “Gauleiter Laski.”111
Others, though, were uncomfortable with Churchill’s broadcast. After polling, the
Newbury Weekly News praised the victorious local Tory, Anthony Hurd, for his
refusal to stress “the Laski and Gestapo stunts” and attributed his win in part to
the fact that he had campaigned “on more dignified and positive lines.”112 David
Renton, who successfully fought for election in Huntingdonshire as a National
Liberal, recalled that Churchill’s Gestapo speech “didn’t go down well. I made a
joke of it in Huntingdonshire and found that other people made a joke of it too.
Rather giving the impression that he’d intended it as a bit of a joke.”113
Historians tend to suggest that, as Steven Fielding puts it, “Hostility to blatant
partisanship explains the response to Churchill’s infamous first radio speech of the
campaign.”114 The implication is that Labour did not engage in similar tactics. It
is true that Attlee refrained from repeating the comparison he had made when
the coalition broke up. Others were far less restrained, however, taking Churchill’s
broadcast as a license to reply in kind. The Independent Labour Party’s New Leader
highlighted a story of state brutality against strikers when Churchill was home
107 “Report on the General Election, June–July 1945,” File Report 2270A, October 1945, Mass-
Observation archive, University of Sussex.
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secretary before World War I. After describing the battery of civilians by police
and soldiers, it revealed that this was “not Germany under Hitler” but “Britain
under Winston Churchill!”115 Emrys Hughes declared in Forward that if Churchill
“had been born in Germany he would have been a Nazi.” Admittedly, the British
plutocracy had not yet needed a Hitler to maintain its interests, “But if ever the
time did come when Big Business and Vested Interests found it necessary to
dispense with their pretended devotion to democracy, we have no illusions as to
who would be running the Gestapo.”116 Toward the end of the campaign, he
published a further article under the headline “Fuhrer Churchill!” in which he
criticized the Conservative campaign’s focus on the prime minister: “This attempt
to create and exploit mass emotion, to idolise one man, and to make people think
he is the only possible leader, is the British Tory attempt to imitate the Fuhrer
worship of the Nazis.”117 Michael Foot, journalist and candidate for Plymouth
Devonport, also referred to Churchill, perhaps half in jest, as the Tory “Fuehrer.”118
This idea was certainly a potential source of humor, as in the limerick quoted at
the start of this article.
Some such examples were fairly trivial.119 But many of the attacks were serious
and cannot be dismissed as simply the work of the lunatic fringe or of obscure
candidates. Senior Labour figures were happy to associate the Conservatives with
fascism. Cripps, speaking in Glasgow, found it sinister that there was no mention
of the word “Conservative” in Churchill’s manifesto: “In Cumberland I saw some-
one was running as a ‘Churchill candidate’. We seem to be getting nearer and
nearer the Fuhrer idea.”120 A. V. Alexander, former first lord of the admiralty,
declared that before the war, “Under Tory rule there were millions of wives whose
housekeeping money consisted of a bare unemployment allowance under the Ge-
stapo of the means test.”121 In one of Labour’s official election broadcasts, Philip
Noel-Baker, MP, argued, on the basis of the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty,
that “the Tories helped the Axis.”122 The Liberals also joined in. “The Conservative
Party claim the definite right to govern apparently in perpetuity,” claimed Lord
Samuel, echoing remarks made previously by Herbert Morrison. “That is the
principle of Nazism and Fascism.”123 To draw attention to these remarks is not to
claim that they were precisely equivalent to Churchill’s language. Opposition pol-
iticians did not tend to make the explicit claim that the return of a Conservative
government would lead literally to totalitarianism. The crucial point is that Tories
and their press supporters would have found it much easier to attack the claims
115 Jon Evans, “Churchill—Enemy of the Workers!” New Leader, 16 June 1945. On Churchill’s
record as home secretary in relation to the Gestapo speech, see also the comparatively mild but none-
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119 See “Rejoinders to Premier’s Broadcast,” Manchester Guardian, 6 June 1945; and “‘Tory Gestapo
Put Gag on Leading Scientists,’” Reynolds News, 17 June 1945. For examples relating to Tory MPs’
alleged fascist sympathies, see Kelly, “‘Ghost of Neville Chamberlain,’” 21.
120 “Cripps Answers Churchill,” Forward, 16 June 1945.
121 “Tories and Mr. Churchill,” Manchester Guardian, 12 June 1945.
122 “Axis Aid by Tories,” Sunday Pictorial, 17 June 1945.
123 “Liberals Are Rallying in the West,” News Chronicle, 9 June 1945. For Morrison’s comments,
see “Churchill’s Crazy Broadcast,” Daily Herald, 5 June 1945.
678  TOYE
they did make as extreme had not Churchill spiked his own side’s guns with his
reference to the Gestapo.
And what of Churchill himself? A draft for his second election broadcast (given
on 13 June) included the following remark: “I am glad the word ‘Gestapo’ stung,
because it will show a lot of harmless and worthy people the way they are going,
and where they will finish up if they are not stopped in good time while the nation
remains free.”124 When it came to the point, he did not say this, but he did renew
the charge that under socialism “all effective and healthy opposition and the natural
change of parties in office from time to time would necessarily come to an end,
and a political police would be required to enforce an absolute and permanent
system upon the nation.”125 Speaking in South London at the very end of the
campaign, he explicitly repeated the Gestapo claim, in words very close to those
he had used in his broadcast. When a heckler objected, Churchill told him: “I see
an ugly look on your face. It looks just like what a Gestapo would resemble.”126
In the interval between polling day and the announcement of the results, Chur-
chill and Attlee traveled together to Potsdam. During the conference, Churchill
introduced Stalin to Lord Cherwell (“the Prof”), his scientific and statistical ad-
viser, for the first time. According to Roy Harrod’s memoir of Cherwell, the prime
minister “had no ready formula for describing the Prof. He explained that he was
a man who had been advising him about a balanced use of our resources for the
war effort, drawing his attention to shortfalls, and generally keeping his eye on
the whole scene of government, to inform him if anything was amiss; in fact he
had acted as a kind of Gestapo for him. ‘Oh!’ said Stalin immediately, ‘I thought
it was only Mr. Attlee who had a Gestapo.’”127
  
It is a myth that during the election Churchill and the Conservatives engaged
in a form of “blatant partisanship” that the opposition responsibly eschewed.128
In pointing this out, we need not descend to the level of Beaverbrook’s Evening
Standard, which, responding to early criticisms of the Gestapo speech, drew at-
tention to Attlee’s earlier remarks and asked, “Well, who began it?”129 And we
certainly should not go as far Colm Brogan, a polemicist admired by Margaret
Thatcher, who accused Labour of using tactics during the election that would
have put Goebbels to shame.130 Rather, we need to consider why the myth arose—
which it did very quickly—in order to understand more clearly the nature of
Churchill’s rhetorical transgression. Why was he unable to get away with saying
that Labour would have to rely on some form of Gestapo, when his opponents
124 Draft of broadcast of 13 June 1945, Churchill Papers, CHAR 9/208B, fol. 106.
125 Broadcast of 13 June 1945.
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took little heat for suggesting that the Conservatives accepted fascist principles?
What unwritten rule had he broken?
One possibility is that comparing one’s opponents to Nazis was generally al-
lowable, but not for prime ministers or potential prime ministers. Having initially
goaded Churchill with his comments on the referendum idea, Attlee surely did
well to drop this line of criticism, creating a contrast between his own calm de-
meanor and his opponent’s apparently hysterical tone. It may also be that Attlee’s
colleagues would all have done well to follow—as many actually did—his “com-
monsense” method of attack rather than alleging that Churchill was the Tory
equivalent of Hitler. All the same, it is not clear that the line of attack adopted
by Churchill was necessarily infra dig for a prime minister. During the 1964 elec-
tion—admittedly at some remove from the horrors of Belsen—Sir Alec Douglas-
Home drew parallels between the activities of Labour hecklers and the past thug-
gery of the Nazis.131 In 1976, James Callaghan accused Conservative leader
Margaret Thatcher of being “rather Goebbelistic” in her descriptions of Labour’s
economic record. This caused no great storm; in fact, the Labour Party put out
a leaflet to advertise the remark.132 Moreover, Churchill’s critics at the time and
since did not, in the main, accuse him of being “un-prime-ministerial” but rather
of having done something inconsistent with the position of “national leader.”133
Innumerable commentators on the Gestapo speech have suggested that, having
held that position, he threw it away at a stroke. (“Mr. Churchill last night put off
national leadership and became a party chieftain of the old-fashioned type,” claimed
the News Chronicle.)134 They all appeared to assume that this “national leader”
status was a tremendous advantage for him and that only a character defect, mental
spasm, or the sinister influence of Beaverbrook and Bracken could have led him
to jeopardize it. Churchill himself clearly valued that status but at the same time
must have appreciated its fragility; the slightest misstep could open him to the
charge that he was failing to live up to it. This explains the lengths to which he
went in the broadcast to shore up his “National” credentials, a strategy that, on
the surface, made sense given the pool of former Liberal support that stood to
be captured.135 Yet his attempt to distance himself from Conservatives by iden-
tifying himself as “National” backfired. This was because the Conservatives were
themselves associated with the “National” label, always portrayed by Labour as a
fraud, a claim much more easily pressed after the events of 1940. Attlee’s achieve-
ment in his reply was to manipulate the various senses of “national” to Churchill’s
131 Lawrence, Electing Our Masters, 210.
132 The leaflet, along with a copy of Callaghan’s remark in Hansard (9 November 1976) can be found
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disadvantage. In his account, Churchill had been the great leader of the united
nation—and had, with his broadcast, stopped being so. The addition of a few
independents and domesticated Liberals did not make his caretaker government
National, a point the demise of National Labour reinforced. In contrast to the
sectionalism of the Conservatives, Labour was the true national party, capable of
transcending class interests in a way that Churchill could not. Churchill’s apparently
winning card turned out to be dud.
This is not to say that Churchill played his hand well. His appeal to individualism
was intelligible in the context of an appeal to Liberals, especially given the Liberal
Party’s own wartime swing to the left, but the Gestapo remark was an unforced
error. He may have intended it as a broader, politico-philosophical point, but it
is scarcely surprising that it was seen as a personal attack on the Labour politicians
with whom he had recently worked closely. The standard explanations for the
mistake are not without merit. He was indeed physically and mentally exhausted
after five years as prime minister at war. “I am worried about this damned election,”
he told his doctor midway through the campaign. “I have no message for them
now.”136 This contributed to a failure that was artistic as much as political. On 22
June, Vita Sackville-West, instinctively Conservative but not much interested in
politics, wrote to her husband, the National Labour MP Harold Nicolson: “You
know I have an admiration for Winston amounting to idolatry, so I am dreadfully
distressed by the badness of his broadcast Election speeches. What has gone wrong
with him? They are confused, woolly, unconstructive and so wordy that it is im-
possible to pick out any concrete impression from them. If I were a wobbler, they
would tip me over to the other side.”137 Arguably, though, his rhetorical collapse
was the product of his political predicament rather than the primary cause of it.
The role of “national leader” in which he found himself imprisoned was widely
perceived to preclude various kinds of conduct in which, as a party leader at election
time, it was hard to avoid indulging.138 When protesting his wife’s suggestion that
he should retire at the end of the war to avoid having to lead one section of the
nation against the other, he liked to say that he was not yet ready “to be put on
a pedestal.”139 His tragedy in 1945 was that he was already on the pedestal and,
if he wanted to continue in politics, he would inevitably be pilloried for stepping
down from it.
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